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"Money Supply Drops $3 Billion, Sends Stocks and 
Bonds Higher." "Market Drops on Fears of a July Money 
Bulge." Headlines like these appear weekly in the financial 
press. They reflect a preoccupation with money that stems 
from the fact that the policy strategy of the Federal 
Reserve is to control the money supply, to control it so that 
the economy has the amount estimated to be necessary for 
the achievement of the nation's goals for output and prices. 
Just how well the Fed keeps the money supply on target 
has important implications for the economy—not only for 
production and prices, but also for profits, stock prices, and 
interest rates. It is therefore understandable why financial 
markets and the press show a vital interest in money, with 
whether it is growing too rapidly, too slowly, or about in 
line with Fed intentions. 
This concern is almost exclusively with how money 
behaves, not with what money is. Yet this last question is 
critical to the Fed. There can be no control without a 
quantity to control, no quantity without a measurement 
process, no measurement without a definition that identi-
fies the assets to be quantified, and no definition without a 
prior idea or concept of what it is that a definition should 
seek to identify. These are the essentials that are prelimi-
nary to any control policy. 
The purpose of this article is to take a closer look at 
these essentials. What is the money the Fed attempts to 
control? What is it in concept, definition, and measure-
ment? Answering these questions can bring out some of 
the complexities and difficulties that are encountered in 
obtaining a quantity to control. 
Defining Money 
Defining money, which is the task of identifying the real 
world assets held by the public that are to be called money, 
requires a prior idea or concept of what money is. There 
are at present two leading concepts, a duality that reflects a 
lack of agreement among economists on the essential, dis-
tinguishing characteristics of the assets to be classified as 
money for purposes of analyzing and formulating mone-
tary policy.
1 The more restrictive of these concepts is that 
money consists of those assets held by the public that are 
generally acceptable in payment of goods and services. 
This concept focuses on money's role as a medium of 
exchange and is probably the concept that most econo-
mists prefer. 
Some economists, however, suggest that money has 
another role—to act as a temporary abode of purchasing 
power or store of value. The main proponents of this view, 
Friedman and Schwartz, note that a money economy is 
distinguished from a barter system by the existence of a 
medium of exchange which permits the sale of one 
commodity to be separated from the purchase of another. 
They point out that, during the time between a sale and a 
purchase, the seller does not always have to retain the sales 
*I wish to thank Frederick Furlong of the staff of the Federal Reserve Board 
of Governors and Roderick Long of the staff of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Minneapolis for providing information about some of the intricacies of definition 
and measurement. 
1A third view is that money consists of the noninterest-bearing liabilities of 
the monetary authority that can be used to settle debts. In the U.S. economy, 
these liabilities are the currency issued by the Federal Reserve and the U.S. 
Treasury and the deposits held by depository institutions at the Fed. Since both 
items—currency and deposits at the Fed—can be used by depository institutions 
to satisfy their legal reserve requirements, this concept and its associated 
definition and quantitative measure are often referred to as high-powered or base 
money. Discussion of it is omitted from this article because it does not currently 
serve as an intermediate monetary target in the Fed's policy strategy. 
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proceeds in the form of the medium of exchange; other 
financial assets, not themselves media of exchange, may 
be available as alternative means of storing purchasing 
power. If so, and if these other assets are considered by the 
public to be close substitutes for the medium of exchange, 
then, according to this view, the relevant variable for 
monetary policy includes both the medium of exchange 
and these substitutes.
2 If close substitutes do not exist, then 
the appropriate total would simply be the medium of 
exchange. (See Friedman and Schwartz 1970, pp. 89-90, 
106-107.) 
In practice, of course, these two concepts of money 
could amount to the same thing. That is, the assets that 
function as media of exchange could be the public's only 
assets that serve as temporary stores of purchasing power. 
But this isn't true in the complicated U.S. financial system. 
The Fed, therefore, tries to identify which existing finan-
cial assets held by the public correspond to each of these 
two concepts. 
As yet, the Fed has no magic formula for doing this. In 
determining whether an asset serves as a medium of 
exchange or a temporary store of value, consideration is 
given to both direct and indirect evidence. The direct evi-
dence includes qualitative information on the character 
and use of financial assets and quantitative data on the 
dollar amounts outstanding, the distributions of these 
amounts among different types of holders, such as individ-
uals and firms, and the frequency with which the assets 
may be employed in carrying out transactions. 
The indirect evidence the Fed examines consists pri-
marily of measures of correlation between various groups 
of assets that are candidates for the title, money, and 
various nonmonetary economic variables that, according 
to dominant monetary theories, ought to be correlated with 
money. The Fed has looked at several tests of this kind, 
including those that search over several candidates for the 
one definition of money that has the highest correlation 
with some measure of national income, like gross national 
product, and those that attempt to determine which 
definition is most highly correlated with a set of variables 
(including interest rates and income) used to predict and 
explain the public's demand for money. Even with this 
direct and indirect evidence, however, the Fed's assess-
ment of the role of any particular asset usually requires a 
substantial use of judgment.
3 
In its attempts at matching financial assets and money 
concepts, the Fed also must contend with the practical 
matter of data availability. If casual observation suggests 
the importance of a particular financial asset for inclusion 
in, say, the medium of exchange definition of money, the 
final decision will in part depend on the availability of 
accurate and comprehensive information on the amount of 
the asset outstanding. If data are not available, the Fed 
weighs the cost of collecting them and the relation of this 
cost to the significance of the item. 
The end products of these definitional efforts can be 
said to answer two questions. What financial assets held 
by the public have the characteristics called for by the 
theoretical concepts? And what is meant by the term, 
public? This last question might appear to have a self-
evident answer, namely, U.S. residents. But this is not the 
case. Before this point is considered in more detail, the 
question of assets is taken up. 
/Assess That Match Concepts 
With the two basic concepts discussed earlier as starting 
points, the Fed defines and then measures three money 
supplies, labeled Ml, M2, and M3. The first is the 
empirical counterpart to the concept of money as a 
medium of exchange, while the other two are representa-
tives of money as a temporary store of purchasing power. 
• Medium of Exchange: M1 
Prior to 1980, the Fed defined Ml to be the sum of 
currency and commercial bank demand deposits held by 
the public. At least through the early 1970s, there was little 
doubt within the Federal Reserve System or most of the 
economics profession that this was a fitting definition. The 
main reservation of some observers concerned the treat-
ment of traveler's checks: the amounts issued by commer-
cial banks were reported to the Fed as demand deposits 
and thus were counted in M1, as it was generally agreed 
they should be, but the amounts of traveler's checks issued 
by nonbanks such as American Express were not counted 
because data on them were not available. 
2The term close substitute refers, in this context, to an asset that either 
matures quickly into an exchange medium or can be converted to an exchange 
medium at (or close to) face value with little effort and cost. 
3The correlation tests described above make use of time series data. In order 
that such tests provide reliable information about definitional questions, it is 
necessary that the most recent data period be homogeneous, that is, that the 
period be one in which no significant changes have taken place in the menu and 
character of financial assets and services. When this condition is violated, as it has 
been in the U.S. financial system for the past several years, the results of such tests 
must be viewed with more than ordinary scepticism. This in turn means that in 
matters of definition more reliance must be placed on the direct evidence 
concerning use of assets by the public. 
11 The Fed's confidence in this definition began to break 
down in the mid-1970s when the financial system began to 
undergo significant and fairly persistent change. Particu-
larly relevant for M1 was the development of new types of 
interest-earning savings deposits on which checks could be 
written. These included negotiable order of withdrawal 
(NOW) accounts and automatic transfer savings (ATS) 
accounts at both banks and thrift institutions and share 
draft balances at credit unions.
4 Hereafter, this group of 
assets is referred to as other checkable deposits (OCDs).
5 
In mid-1975, OCDs totaled only $700 million, consider-
ably less than 1 percent of the amount of commercial bank 
demand deposits held by the public. But by mid-1979, the 
total had expanded to $14.7 billion, almost 6 percent of 
demand deposits. This remarkable growth attested to the 
apparent attractiveness of OCDs and suggested that they 
would continue to gain in popularity and further outdate 
the existing definition of M1. 
In response to the changing financial system, the Fed in 
early 1979 published a proposal for redefining the mone-
tary aggregates, asked for written comments from interest-
ed parties, and held seminars with recognized experts to 
solicit their views. (See Simpson 1979.) With respect to 
the medium of exchange, the proposal called for adding 
OCDs to old Ml and subtracting commercial bank 
demand deposits held by foreign commercial banks and 
official institutions. (This last item will be discussed later.) 
Those responding to the Fed's proposal generally agreed 
on these changes. However, some thought the proposal for 
Ml might be too narrow. In particular, the suggestion was 
made that Ml include shares in money market mutual 
funds (MMMFs), since shareholders generally have or 
can sign up for the option of writing checks on their 
accounts in amounts above specified minimums (usually 
$500). Also put up as candidates for Ml were overnight 
repurchase agreements (RPs) issued by commercial banks 
and overnight Eurodollar deposits.
6 These items do not 
serve as media of exchange, but their extremely short 
maturity, less than 24 hours, convinced some observers 
(and still does) that they are in practical effect the same as, 
and should be counted with, demand deposits. (See 
Garcia and Pak 1979 and Hart 1980, pp. 89-92.) 
On the basis of these views as well as substantial work 
by the Federal Reserve Board staff, the Fed announced 
new definitions in early 1980. (See Simpson 1980.) 
OCDs were included in M1 because of their role as media 
of exchange. (This is a role, it should be noted, that has 
grown substantially since 1980; OCDs now total about 
$87 billion, equal to 38 percent of commercial bank 
demand deposits held by the public.)
7 The other suggested 
items were not included in Ml, because they did not 
appear to resemble media of exchange closely enough. 
The Fed omitted shares in MMMFs because their 
turnover rate, a measure of their activity, was about the 
same as savings deposits' and far short of the turnover rate 
exhibited by demand deposits. RPs were left out because 
the evidence on how large organizations used them in cash 
management programs suggested that they were compara-
ble to other short-term financial assets rather than the 
equivalent of demand deposits. Finally, overnight Euro-
dollar deposits were excluded because of their similarity in 
function to RPs. The Fed also indicated that it would 
shortly be able to add traveler's checks issued by nonbank-
ing organizations, which it did in mid-1981. As a result, 
Ml now includes currency, demand deposits at commer-
cial banks, OCDs at all depositories, and traveler's checks 
of nonbanking firms. 
• Temporary Stores of Value: M2 and M3 
The task of finding the empirical counterpart to money as a 
temporary abode of purchasing power is that of drawing a 
line in the long continuum of financial assets, a line 
between those that are media of exchange and close 
substitutes for media and those that are not. The presump-
tion is that such a line exists and can be found, but the 
difficulties of acting on this presumption, drawing a line 
between money and nonmoney, have always been formi-
dable, whether reliance has been placed on experience and 
judgment or on statistical tests. Furthermore, as already 
noted, the difficulties have been compounded in recent 
years by the extent of change in the financial system, 
4 ATS accounts are savings accounts from which funds in the necessary 
amounts are automatically transferred to associated checking accounts in order to 
cover checks presented for payment. Thus, ATS accounts are not technically 
media of exchange, since checks are not drawn against them, but they in effect 
serve this function because of the automatic transfer feature. 
SOCDs also include a small amount of demand deposits at thrift institutions 
located in those few states that permit thrifts to offer such deposits. 
6 Repurchase agreements are arrangements in which one party sells assets to 
a second party and agrees to buy them back at some specified price and future 
date. Depositories sell securities from their portfolios under such arrangements as 
a means of borrowing funds. Eurodollar deposits are U.S. dollar-denominated 
deposits issued by banking organizations located outside the United States. 
7One of the primary factors accounting for this expansion was the 1981 
introduction of NOW accounts on a national scale. Prior to this time, NOW 
accounts had only been legal in New York, New Jersey, and the New England 
states. The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 
1980 extended to all depository institutions the authority to offer NOW accounts 
starting December 31, 1980. 
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which has altered the continuum and made the drawing of 
any line a more tentative undertaking. 
In recognition of the complexity of the problem, the 
Fed has two definitions of money as a temporary store of 
value, M2 and M3. Like M1, they were redefined in 1980 
to take account of the changed character of financial 
assets.
8 The Fed's current definition of M2 starts with M1 
and adds the following fixed-price assets, the first three of 
which were among the rejected candidates for M1: 
• Overnight RPs issued by commercial banks. 
• Overnight Eurodollar deposits issued by Caribbean 
branches of member banks to U.S. residents. 
• Shares in general purpose and broker/dealer MMMFs. 
• Savings deposits at all depositories other than NOW, 
ATS, and share draft accounts included in Ml. 
Though depository institutions have the right to require 
prior notice of withdrawal of not less than 14 days, as a 
general rule this right is not exercised. As a result, savings 
deposits can be withdrawn at any time, often with a 
telephone call. 
• Small time deposits (less than $100,000) at 
all depositories. 
This category includes standard types of time deposits, 
such as the six-month and recently authorized three-month 
money market certificates. Time deposits can only be 
withdrawn before maturity with a substantial penalty. Also 
included are small RPs other than those already counted in 
the overnight category; they are termed retail RPs, are less 
than $100,000, and have less than 90 days to maturity. 
The Fed considers these assets to be close substitutes for 
money: either they have short maturities and thus mature 
quickly into cash, as do RPs, overnight Eurodollar de-
posits, and small time deposits, or they can with little or no 
cost be converted into cash at the holder's option, as can 
shares in money funds and savings deposits. 
As an alternative line between money and nonmoney, 
the Fed has an even broader definition, M3. It consists of 
M2 plus assets that are highly liquid in the sense just 
described but far more restricted in use because of size or 
convention; that is, these assets are used primarily by large 
organizations, not individuals. The added assets include 
•Large time deposits ($100,000 and over) at 
all depositories. 
•RPs $100,000 and over and more than one day 
in maturity at all depositories. 
They are designated term RPs. 




Now that money definitions have been described in terms 
of assets, the discussion can turn to the question raised 
earlier: Who are the holders of the assets just listed that are 
counted as members of the public? 
This question arises largely because U.S. monetary 
assets can be held by nonresidents as well as residents of 
the United States. How should nonresident holdings be 
treated? In general, the Fed lets them remain in U.S. 
monetary statistics if they are held primarily for the 
purpose of making purchases of U.S. goods and services 
and excludes them otherwise. But this principle cannot 
always be applied. 
Consider U.S. currency. Casual observation indicates 
that it is held (and often circulated) in places as widely 
separated as Mexico and Poland. Just how much is held 
by nonresidents is not known; there are no reliable 
estimates. As a result, all U.S. currency is counted as a 
component of U.S. money, even though some part is held 
outside the country and may have no relation to U.S. 
economic activity. 
What of other U.S. monetary assets that can be held by 
nonresidents? The Fed excludes amounts owned by 
foreign commercial banks and foreign official institutions 
from all money definitions because they are largely held as 
international reserves or for clearing and financing foreign 
8ln addition to currency and commercial bank demand deposits included in 
old Ml, old M2 included time and savings deposits at commercial banks less 
negotiable certificates of deposits at large banks. Old M3 was defined as old M2 
plus time and savings deposits at thrifts. Notice that the definitions of old M2 and 
M3 are based on a distinction between type of issuing institution; that is, time and 
savings deposits issued by banks are considered different from similar types of 
deposits issued by thrifts. This distinction was eliminated in the 1980 redefinition. 
In the current M2, all savings and small time deposits are included, whether 
issued by banks or thrifts (Simpson 1980). 
90ne important attribute of the assets listed in the three definitions is that, as a 
general rule, they are all issued by financial institutions located in the United 
States. The one exception is overnight Eurodollar deposits at Caribbean 
branches of member banks. This item was added at the time of the 1980 redefini-
tions, as noted previously. All other Eurodollar deposits owned by U.S. residents 
were excluded from serious consideration at that time because of a lack of 
timeliness in the availability of appropriate data. However, the dollar volume of 
these deposits has grown rapidly in recent years, raising again the issue of whether 
they belong in some definition of U.S. money. The Board staff is now attempting 
to reduce the lag with which Eurodollar information is received so that the 
question of their incorporation can be reconsidered. If and when they are added, 
the assets included in U.S. money definitions will take a second step beyond the 
range of domestically issued assets. 
13 exchange operations, not for purchasing U.S. goods and 
services. However, monetary assets held by all other 
nonresidents are counted in U.S. money definitions 





It is one thing to give definitions and quite another to 
provide quantitative measures of Ml and the other 
monetary aggregates. To go from one to the other, the Fed 
undertakes a multistage process of collecting and pro-
cessing data. The basic data come from the institutions 
that issue money. The balance sheet information they 
supply goes through several processing steps. It is first 
carefiilly reviewed for errors. Next, since the basic data 
from some reporters are not complete, statistical proce-
dures are used to fill the gaps. Then adjustments are made 
to eliminate double-counting. The products of these steps 
are the Fed's money supply measurements or, it might be 
more appropriate to say, estimates. Finally, the Fed 
seasonally adjusts these estimates so that users of money 
supply statistics have both adjusted and unadjusted figures 
with which to work. Seasonal adjustment has recently 
been discussed in detail elsewhere (Pierce and Cleveland 
1981), so will not be taken up here. 
Collecting Data 
The basic data for measuring the monetary aggregates 
come to the Fed from issuing institutions located in the 
United States—from the Fed itself, the U.S. Treasury, 
bank and thrift depositories, money market mutual funds, 
and nonbank issuers of traveler's checks. The task of 
recording the necessary information, on the one side, and 
collecting it, on the other, entails an enormous effort by 
both financial institutions and the Fed. An appreciation of 
the size of the job can perhaps be glimpsed by noting some 
of its dimensions. 
At present, there are about 10 nonbank issuers of 
traveler's checks; they furnish end-of-the-month data to 
the Fed on their outstanding checks. Money market 
mutual funds, which number about 220, report their end-
of-the-week outstanding shares to the Investment Com-
pany Institute, the industry trade organization that in turn 
provides data to the Fed. 
These numbers are dwarfed by the number of deposi-
tories that provide data: about 40,400. Of these, 17,800 
report to the Fed indirectly. They are depositories which 
are not members of the Federal Reserve System and 
which are exempt from Fed requirements on filing reports 
and maintaining reserves because of their small size; in 
total, they account for less than one-half a percent of M2-
type deposits. They do submit quarterly or semiannual 
balance sheet figures to their chartering agencies, and this 
information is obtained by the Fed, though sometimes 
with a considerable lag. The remaining and largest number 
of depositories, some 22,600, supply data directly to the 
Fed. Their report of deposits, which provides the bulk of 
the information needed for money measurement, gives 
information on 13 types of depository liabilities and 3 
classes of assets. The reporting burden is heaviest for the 
largest organizations. Weekly reporters number 14,900 
and supply seven days of balance sheet data with each 
report. They are institutions with $15 million or more in 
total deposits and smaller institutions that either elect to 
supply data on a weekly basis or are required to do so 
because of their involvement in international banking. 
Quarterly reporters are all other depositories. They num-
ber 7,700 and hold about 3 percent of M2-type deposits. 
They are divided into three panels of approximately equal 
size, with one panel reporting each month. They provide 
seven days of data for the third week of the month in which 
they report. 
Correcting and Completing Data 
All information used in measuring the monetary aggre-
gates is carefully reviewed to eliminate errors. In the case 
of the depositories that report directly to the Fed, their data 
are edited twice, first at the regional Federal Reserve 
Banks, where the reporting forms are initially received, 
then at the Federal Reserve Board in Washington, D.C., 
where final processing takes place. Report data are 
examined for arithmetic accuracy, then searched for what 
appear to be implausibly large day-to-day and week-to-
week changes. All outliers are checked with the reporting 
institutions. Report data are also examined for consistency 
with information submitted on other report forms. 
The next step in processing is estimation. It is under-
taken because the data obtained by the Fed are not 
complete; that is, some data do not have a daily frequency 
or do not cover all the relevant institutions. 
The bulk of the information reported to the Fed is 
consecutive-day data, the type necessary to construct 
money measures as averages of daily figures for the stan-
l°The Fed's treatment of monetary assets other than currency held by 
nonresidents is based on work done by the Advisory Committee on Monetary 
Statistics (1976, pp. 4, 15-18). 
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dard periods of a week or a month. When daily data aren't 
available, various interpolation and projection techniques 
are used by the Fed to estimate the missing data. For 
example, quarterly reporting depositories supply only one 
week of data per quarter. The interpolation procedure used 
to estimate their balance sheet figures for the twelve weeks 
between any two weeks of reported data makes use of 
information received from a limited group of small 
depositories that do supply weekly reports on their daily 
data. The procedure assumes that the daily and weekly 
behavioral pattern of deposits at this group is the same as 
that at quarterly reporters. Further, in order to obtain 
information on quarterly reporters between the time of 
their last report and the time of their next, the same 
procedure is employed to project their weekly and monthly 
deposit levels. In this way, the Fed can promptly release 
initial money supply estimates for periods that have just 
closed. When actual data are received, revised estimates 
are published. 
The need for estimation also arises when information 
comes from only a subgroup rather than all relevant insti-
tutions. In terms of dollar values involved, the only 
significant example is RPs. Overnight and retail RPs are 
elements of M2, while term RPs of $100,000 and over go 
into M3. Since data on RPs are not supplied on the report 
of deposits referred to earlier, the Fed relies on a sample of 
depositories. Their data are statistically blown up to 
represent RPs at all institutions, the blow-up factors 
determined from studies of the more comprehensive data 
obtainable from other reports and special surveys. 
Eliminating Double-Counting 
The last processing step involves the adjustment of 
reported data to eliminate bank float and exclude the 
monetary asset holdings of issuing organizations. Both 
adjustments are made to prevent double-counting and thus 
make the measurement process more accurate.
1
1 
• Bank Float 
The adjustment for bank float is made in the construction 
of M1. Since M1 is a basic component of M2 and M3, the 
adjustment has an indirect effect on these broader aggre-
gates. It is made because deposited checks are immedi-
ately credited to depositors' checking accounts but often 
are not promptly collected from the checking acounts on 
which they are drawn. To ignore this timing lag between 
crediting and collecting would lead to double-counting and 
a sizable overestimate of Ml. 
The correct adjustment would be to subtract from 
deposit data the dollar volume of checks drawn on Ml-
type accounts that have not been collected. But informa-
tion on this ideal concept of bank float is not available. 
What the Fed subtracts is an approximation derived from 
CIPC and FR float. CIPC, or cash items in the process of 
collection, is an asset accounting category on depository 
balance sheets that depositories debit when they send a 
check or other item to be collected to either a correspon-
dent bank or the Federal Reserve. FR float is derived from 
the Fed's balance sheet. It represents the dollar volume of 
checks and other items which have not as yet been collect-
ed but have, because of the Fed's payment schedule, been 
credited to the accounts of the sending depositories (and 
have been taken out of CIPC at these depositories). The 
sum of these two items is the Fed's estimate of bank float.
1
2 
This estimate has well-known imperfections, however. 
CIPC contains items that are not drawn against Ml-type 
checking deposits, items such as food stamps, bond 
coupons, and checks drawn on the U.S. Treasury. Their 
inclusion overloads CIPC, so that subtracting it as part of 
bank float takes too much out of Ml. This is sometimes 
referred to as the cash-items bias. But a second imperfec-
tion works in the opposite direction. Some banks, when 
sending checks to their correspondents for collection, debit 
the asset account due from other banks rather than CIPC, 
with the result that CIPC fails to contain items that it 
should contain. Thus, subtracting CIPC takes too little out 
of Ml. This is referred to as the due-from bias in Ml. 
The importance of these imperfections is not precisely 
known because little evidence exists on the contents of 
CIPC and due-from accounts. Based on indirect evidence, 
however, it is generally believed that, though the two 
biases are quite limited in size, the due-from bias exceeds 
the cash-items bias. This leads to a small overestimate of 
Ml, but an overestimate whose relative size does not 
change significantly over time to distort calculated month-
ly, quarterly, or yearly growth rates.
1
3 
11 Reported data are also adjusted to eliminate the holdings of foreign official 
institutions and commercial banks. That is, their holdings of deposits, repurchase 
agreements issued by depository institutions, and other monetary assets that can 
be specifically identified are excluded from all money measures. The rationale for 
this adjustment was discussed earlier. 
12The Fed does not publish its estimate of float. Some idea of its magnitude 
can be gained by noting that on June 30, 1982, CIPC at all commercial banking 
institutions in the United States amounted to $68.5 billion while FR float totaled 
$2.5 billion. Since the sum of the two fails to incorporate any information on 
CIPC at thrift institutions, it is smaller than the estimate of the float the Fed 
deducts in measuring M1. 
13 For a discussion and analysis of these biases, see Nissen and Beck 1978. 
15 This view was recently challenged in an attempt to 
explain the strong pickup in Ml growth that occurred 
between October 1981 and January 1982. Over this 
period, Ml expanded at a 14.5 percent annual rate, well 
above the rate either expected or desired by the Fed. 
Various explanations were put forward and considerable 
efforts made at the Board and individual Federal Reserve 
Banks to find the most plausible. One thesis was that the 
due-from bias had increased relative to the cash-items bias 
and, in so doing, had given rise to progressively larger 
overestimation errors in M1, which in turn had resulted in 
an upward bias in the calculated growth rate of M1. The 
basis for this thesis was an observation and a conjecture. 
The observation was that banks had been clearing a 
smaller proportion of their checks through the Federal 
Reserve, very likely because of the introduction of Fed 
pricing in mid-1981, and a larger proportion through local 
clearinghouses and the correspondent banking system. 
The conjecture was that this change in clearing patterns 
had been accompanied by a step-up in debits to due-from 
accounts, resulting in an increase in the due-from bias. The 
Board staff examined this possibility and found that the 
ratio of dollar amounts in due-from accounts to dollar 
amounts in CIPC accounts had not risen during 1981 and 
early 1982. This suggested that the two biases had not 
changed relative to one another and had not been the cause 
of the step-up in Ml growth. 
• Holdings of Issuers 
Adjustments are also made to eliminate the monetary 
holdings of the issuers of monetary liabilities and, by 
elimination, to get more accurate measures of the amounts 
held by the public. Consider the case of commercial banks. 
They hold cash in their vaults and demand deposits at 
other banks in order to service the checking accounts of 
their customers. To include in Ml both the customers' 
checking accounts and the interbank demand deposits 
specifically held to service these accounts would be to 
double-count. A similar error would be involved if the 
currency banks hold to provide cash to their checking 
customers were included as part of the public's holdings of 
currency. The general principle: In measuring a particular 
M, exclude from it those amounts held by the issuers to 
service their M-type liabilities. 
For Ml, practice deviates somewhat from the ideal in 
the treatment of commercial banks, though not in the 
treatment of thrift institutions. For thrifts, the adjustment 
involves the exclusion from M1 of a proportion of their 
holdings of vault cash and demand deposits at commercial 
banks, the proportion determined by the ratio of their 
OCD accounts to the sum of their OCD and savings 
accounts. For commercial banks, the adjustment entails 
the subtraction of all vault cash and all commercial bank 
deposits held at other commercial banks, even though 
some portion of these assets, a fairly small proportion, is 
employed to service savings accounts, time deposits, and 
nondeposit liabilities. This way of handling the commer-
cial bank adjustment has a long history in the construction 
of Ml estimates, and its continuation seems explainable 
more in terms of this tradition than anything else. In any 
event, it appears to result in an underestimate of M1. Just 
how much of an underestimate is not easy to judge, but 
most observers agree that the understatement changes 
only slowly and is not a source of bias in short-run Ml 
growth rates (Advisory Committee on Monetary Statistics 
1976, p. 14). 
The differences between the ideal and actual adjust-
ments at the M2 and M3 levels are relatively unimportant 
and are dictated by lack of data. Note that the underesti-
mate of Ml that occurs because of the subtraction of all 
commercial bank holdings of vault cash and deposits at 
other banks does not give rise to underestimates of M2 and 
M3, since for these aggregates the full subtraction is 
approximately correct. 
Final Products 
The adjustments the Fed makes to each of the monetary 
aggregates are summarized in Tables 1 and 2. Several 
points on Table 1 deserve comment. Traveler's checks 
issued by nonbanks are accepted and collected by deposi-
tories, but are not held to service their customers' deposits, 
so no adjustment for this item is required. Traveler's 
checks held by foreign official institutions and commercial 
banks are assumed to be insignificant in size. OCDs are 
not held by the monetary authorities, depositories, or 
foreign official institutions and commercial banks; so no 
adjustments are needed. Finally, while the float adjust-
ment is split between demand deposits and OCDs, the 
sum of the two components is an estimate of the volume of 
checks that have been credited but not yet collected. 
Concluding Note 
The money that the Fed targets in its strategy to achieve 
national goals for prices and output is not something 
simple, definite, and accurate to the last dollar. There are 
three monetary aggregates that serve as targets. They are 
based on the two underlying concepts of money as a 
medium of exchange and money as a temporary store of 
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Table 1 
The Fed's Measure of Money as a Medium of Exchange: M1 
June 1982* 
(averages of daily figures, not seasonally adjusted) 
• Currency outstanding at the Federal Reserve and the U.S. Treasury 
LESS: Holdings of Issuers 
All vault cash held by the Federal Reserve, the U.S. Treasury, 
and commercial banks 
Estimate of vault cash held by thrifts to service OCDs 
EQUALS: Currency component of M1 $128.3 billion 
• Demand deposits at commercial banks 
LESS: Bank Float 
Cash items in the process of collection at commercial banks 
Federal Reserve float 
Holdings of Issuers 
Demand deposits due to the U.S. Treasury and commercial banks 
Estimate of demand deposits due to thrifts used to service OCDs 
Holdings of Nonresidents 
Demand deposits due to foreign commercial banks and official 
institutions 
EQUALS: Demand deposit component of M1 $230.1 billion 
• OCDs at all depositories 
LESS: Bank Float 
Cash items in the process of collection at thrifts 
EQUALS: OCD component of M1 $ 87.0 billion 
• Traveler's checks of nonbank issuers $ 4.7 billion 
TOTAL M1 $450.0 billion** 
'Estimates of July 9,1 982 
**ltems do not add to total due to rounding. 
purchasing power. They depend on definitions that are 
imperfect embodiments of these concepts, imperfect be-
cause of both data restrictions and the complexity of an 
advanced financial system that makes classifying mone-
tary assets into different categories a task marked with 
uncertainties. And they depend on a measurement process 
that produces high quality estimates, but not exact assess-
ments. 
There is a final complication to be noted. Definitions 
depend on the spectrum of financial assets and services 
available to economic agents, and when the spectrum 
changes, existing definitions often become outdated. In 
recent years, the U.S. financial system has experienced 
some very significant modifications as the result of a potent 
mixture of elements: most particularly, market rates of 
interest that have been generally higher (sometimes very 
much higher) than the maximum rates payable by law and 
regulation on deposits; the development and application of 
computer-telecommunications technology, which has 
lowered the real costs of exchanging and storing informa-
17 Table 2 
The Fed's Measures of Money 
as a Temporary Store of Value: M2 and M3 
June 1982* 
(averages of daily figures, not seasonally adjusted) 
• M1 ($450 billion from Table 1) Billions 
LESS: Estimate of vault cash and demand deposits held by thrifts to service 
time and savings deposits 
EQUALS: M1 component of M2 $444.0 
• PLUS: The Following Assets, Excluding 
Holdings of Issuers and Nonresidents** 
Overnight RPs issued by commercial banks 35.7 
Overnight Eurodollars issued by Caribbean branches of Federal 
Reserve member banks to U.S. nonbank residents 7.0 
Shares outstanding at general purpose and broker/dealer MM M Fs 168.6 
Savings deposits at all depositories 347.8 
Small time deposits at all depositories 901.9 
TOTAL M2 $1,905.0 
• M2 ($1,905 billion from previous line) 
LESS: Overnight RPs held by institution-only MMMFs 
EQUALS: M2 component of M3 $1,899.7 
• PLUS: The Following Assets, Excluding 
Holdings of Issuers and Nonresidents** 
Large time deposits at all depositories 323.9 
Term RPs, excluding retail RPs, at all depositories 31.0 
Shares outstanding at institution-only MMMFs 33.7 
TOTAL M3 $2,288.3 
'Estimates of July 9,1982 
**lssuers of M2 include U.S. monetary authorities, depositories, and general purpose and broker/dealer MMMFs. 
Issuers of M3 include issuers of M2 plus institution-only MMMFs. For both M2 and M3, nonresidents include foreign 
official institutions and foreign commercial banks. 
tion; and legal and regulatory changes that have given 
depository institutions greater freedom to compete for 
customers. These factors were primarily responsible for 
the Fed's redefinition of the monetary aggregates in 1980. 
They remain in force at the present time. Thus, the 
definitions discussed above may not prove to be the appro-
priate ones for the financial world of 1984. 
The recent development of sweep accounts provides 
emphasis to this warning. Sweep accounts are checkable 
deposits with automatic management features designed to 
give deposit holders market rates of interest on their 
surplus funds. Accounts differ in details, but a typical one 
might work in the following way. When the amount on 
deposit rises above some set limit—say, $2,600—the 
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excess is automatically swept out at the close of business 
and invested in a money market fund or RP. And when 
cash withdrawals and check payments reduce the deposit 
account below some limit—say, $2,400—funds are auto-
matically drawn back in from these market investments. 
Sweep accounts were relatively unknown in 1981, but 
have now started to spread. One task for the Fed will be to 
keep tabs on how far they go. If they gain in popularity, 
another will be to consider their current definitional 
treatment. Checkable deposits are in Ml, and RPs and 
money market funds for individuals are in M2. Should this 
split continue? Should the investment accounts associated 
with sweep accounts be reclassified into M1, since they in 
effect serve as the source of funds for withdrawals and 
check payments, either immediately or with a short lag? Or 
should they continue to be classified in M2, since 
technically they are not media of exchange? These 
questions may arrive well before 1984. 
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